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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: This study aims to investigate the opportunistic behavior of local government heads in Indonesia 
using discretionary spending (grant spending, social assistance, and financial assistance) to win an election. 
Methodology: The study uses logistic regression on 133 samples of district/municipal governments in Indonesia prior to 
the election period. 
Main findings: The study finds no evidence that the average proportion and growth of discretionary expenditure affects the 
electability of incumbents in Indonesia’s local government head elections. That is, the use of discretionary spending is not 
sufficiently effective to attract sympathy from voters. 
Applications of the study: The results of the study provide inputs, especially for incumbents, to help focus more on 
performance, as it is proven that it leads to a higher probability of being re-elected, rather than the use of discretionary 
spending as an election-winning strategy. Government and NGOs should inform voters to be more cautious about the 
opportunistic behavior of their leaders. 
Novelty/originality of the study: Although some previous studies have examined the use of discretionary spending by 
incumbents, there has been little research, which provides evidence that such spending for political purposes can in fact 
help to win elections. 
Keywords: Discretionary Spending, Grant, Social Assistance, Re-election, Incumbent. 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 2005, local government heads in Indonesia were elected by the regional house of representatives. Since the 
enactment of law number 32 of 2004 regarding local governments, the voters elect local government heads directly 
(Republik Indonesia, 2004). One of the problems that arise when elections are held directly is the use of local spending for 
the incumbents’ personal interests (Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, & Schulze, 2013). According to Mietzner (2012), there have been 
many cases of budget allocations, which have led to budgetary and corruption irregularities committed by local government 
heads at election times. The election of regional heads in Indonesia has become one of the causes of corrupt practices. 
Local government heads that end their tenure and put themselves forward for re-election tend to use discretionary spending 
to increase their popularity to be re-elected in the next period. 
Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, and Schulze (2013) classify grant spending, social assistance spending, and financial assistance as 
discretionary spending. According to the Minister of Internal Affairs regulation number 21/2011, such grants and social 
assistance expenditures fall into the category of indirect spending, whose allocation is not based on specific performance 
targets, which means that the determination of its value tends to be subjective (Republik Indonesia, 2011). Local 
government heads are also authorized to establish a list of beneficiaries, and amounts and allocations of financial 
assistance, especially that of village governments. In addition to their discretionary and populist nature, their broadly 
interpretable definitions and regulations, which do not provide clear and uniform guidelines, make grant spending and 
social assistance expenditures easy to misuse in the political arena. 
Several previous studies have examined the use of discretionary spending by incumbents. Ritonga and Alam (2010) and 
Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, and Schulze (2013) find that the possibility of incumbents being re-elected positively affects their 
discretionary spending. This means that they tend to rise discretionary spending ahead of elections and have the tendency to 
allocate discretionary funds to attract prospective voters. Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) found that political factors affect 
the proportion of discretionary spending ahead of the 2015 regional head elections. The incumbents who have served a one-
time period have the potential to use funds, including grants and social assistance expenditures, for political purposes, while 
the non-incumbents are deemed to have no potential use of these funds. 
The results of previous research are supported by data on practices that have occurred in Indonesia. FITRA (2016) found an 
increasing trend of misuse of grants and social assistance spending, especially in Banten province from 2014 to 2016. This 
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is supported by the audit results of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK), wherein deviations of IDR 378 
billion were found that were related to grants and social assistance in the Banten province budget of 2014-2015. The Centre 
for Budget Analysis (CBA) highlighted that the grant and social assistance spending of 17 provinces conducting elections 
in 2018 are considered vulnerable to such misuse. In addition, Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018) gave indications of the 
politicization of government programs, especially in the form of grants, social assistance, and financial assistance, 
particularly related to village funds. 
Although some previous studies have examined the likely influence of incumbents on discretionary spending, there has 
been little research, which has provided evidence that using such spending for political purposes can in fact help 
incumbents win the elections. Using a sample of local governments in Poland, Kukołowicz and Górecki (2018) found that 
per capita expenditure had a positive effect on the likelihood of incumbent executives' re-election. In addition, incumbent 
candidates benefit from raising local government expenditure. 
Based on the above considerations, this study aims to investigate the opportunistic behavior of local government heads in 
Indonesia using discretionary spending (consisting of grant spending, social assistance, and financial assistance) to win 
elections. The study is expected to contribute by providing empirical evidence as to whether the proportion of discretionary 
spending made by local governments as a political incentive for local government heads to be re-elected can in fact help 
them win elections. 
Overall, the study finds no evidence that such spending influences the electability of incumbents. That is, the use of 
discretionary spending is not sufficiently effective to attract the sympathy of voters. From the results of additional tests, the 
study also finds that total discretionary spending actually has a negative effect, despite the marginal effect on the likelihood 
of incumbents’ victory. These results imply that in order to be re-elected, incumbents should avoid using discretionary 
spending.  
The study is structured as follows. The literature review examines research on discretionary spending and the theory 
underlying the study, while the methodology and analysis sections discuss the methods and outcomes of the testing and 
analysis. The final sections present the conclusion and implications, together with the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for the development of further research, especially regarding discretionary spending. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Discretionary spending 
According to the regulation number 14 of the Indonesian Ministry of Internal Affairs (2016), which is the second 
amendment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs regulation number 32 of 2011 on the guidelines for grants and social 
assistance, grants are the provision of money, goods, or services from the local government to the central government or 
other local governments, local companies, communities, and community organizations, which have been specified for 
certain purposes, non-mandatory and non-binding, and not continuously aimed at supporting the implementation of local 
government affairs (Republik Indonesia, 2016). Social assistance is the provision of aid in the form of money/goods from 
the local government to individuals, families, groups, and/or communities that are not continuous or selective in order to 
protect them against possible social risks. Social risks are events that can lead to potential social vulnerabilities borne by 
individuals, families, groups and/or communities, as a result of social, economic, or political crises, natural phenomena, 
and natural disasters; if not provided for, some may suffer and be unable to live in acceptable conditions. Regulation 
number 14 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 2016, Article 4 and Article 22, also state that local governments can 
provide grants and social assistance in accordance with the financial capacity of the region after prioritizing the fulfillment 
of compulsory business spending by considering the principles of justice, decency, rationality, and benefits for the 
community (Republik Indonesia, 2016). Financial assistance is the funds given to other entities/regions within the 
framework of equity and/or improvement in the financial capacity of the region or recipient village. Examples include 
financial support from provinces to districts, cities, and villages, and financial assistance from districts and cities to villages 
(KSAP, 2016). However, there are no comprehensive regulations governing the procedure of budgeting, allocation, 
distribution, recognition, measurement, and presentation, especially regarding the transfer of financial assistance from 
districts or municipal governments. 
According to regulation number 21 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 2011, which is the second amendment of the 
regulation number 13 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 2006, grant and social assistance expenditure is included in the 
category of indirect spending, whose allocation is not based on specific performance targets, meaning that the 
determination of the budget amount tends to be subjective, non-binding, and not sustainable (Republik Indonesia, 2011). In 
addition, Amalia and Pratolo (2015) state that grant expenditure, social assistance expenditure, and financial assistance 
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spending are included in expenditures tailored to governmental affairs under regional authorities. Although there has been a 
formula to calculate the amount of financial assistance expenditure/transfer, the local government head is authorized to 
determine the list of recipients of financial assistance and the amounts paid under the decree or regulation of 
regents/mayors. Therefore, these three expenditures (grant expenditure, social assistance expenditure, and financial 
assistance spending) are categorized as discretionary spending. 
Public Choice Theory 
Public Choice Theory explains how public decisions are made and involves the interaction of voters with politicians or 
bureaucrats. The theory explains that elected officials do not fundamentally change their character or abandon the rational 
and selfish nature they display as individuals in government (Buchanan & Tollison, 1984; Larkin Jr, 2016). Although 
politicians and bureaucrats act in the political market and their primary motive is self-interest, they have some concern for 
others. For example, politicians are motivated to hold or stay in office, while bureaucrats endeavor to expand their authority 
in the political market.  
Public choice theory has been used by researchers to analyze political behavior, as they believe that this theory is able to 
bridge economics and political science. Just as in the economic view of rational thinking, the public choice theory assumes 
that local government heads prefer personal interests to political motivations, especially in the lead-up to elections. Voters 
tend to vote for local government heads, who offer benefits to them, even in the short term. They may also think that they 
are bound by an obligation to provide political support for those who practice discretionary spending to enable recipients to 
repay their voting rights in elections. 
Discretionary spending and related issues 
Due to its discretionary and populist nature, discretionary spending is easy to be misused, one of which is for political 
purposes (Ritonga & Alam, 2010; Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, & Schulze, 2013). Mauro (1998) examined corruption in the 
composition of public budgets. Other research investigate election contestation in relationship with political decision 
making, such as public service budgeting and its deviations (Keefer & Khemani, 2003; Ritonga & Alam, 2010; Setiawan & 
Rizkiah, 2017; Sjahrir et al., 2013; Winoto & Falikhatun, 2015).The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) found 
nominal grant funds in local government budget tended to increase in the period 2011-2013. KPK (2014) also believes that 
there has been a shift in the trend of transferring social assistance funds into other funds ahead of elections; that is, ones, 
which are more suitable for the political interests of the local government head. The Indonesian Forum for Budget 
Transparency (FITRA) found an increasing trend in the misuse of grants and social assistance grants, especially in Banten 
Province in the period 2014-2016. This is supported by the audit results of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia 
(BPK), which found misuse of Rp378 billion worth of grants and social assistance in the provincial budget of Banten in 
2014-2015. In addition, the Center for Budget Analysis (CBA) highlighted grants and social assistance budget in 17 
provinces that were to conduct elections in 2018, amounting to IDR 39.72 trillion, which was considered vulnerable to 
misuse by governor candidates. In addition, there has been a corruption case related to alleged misappropriation of political 
party aid funds by the Regent of Jepara, who used the grant from the 2011-2012 budget for party holiday allowances (Detik 
News, 2017, July 6).  
In order to anticipate the politicization of grant and social assistance expenditures by local government heads in the 2015 
elections, the KPK urged local government heads to manage such funds based on regulation number 39 of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs of 2012 on the amendment to regulation number 32 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 2011 concerning 
guidance on grants and social assistance sourced from regional revenue budgets, in which the process of grant and social 
assistance disbursement became more stringent than the previous process (Republik Indonesia, 2012). However, changes to 
grant spending and social assistance budgeting mechanisms do not necessarily guarantee misuse for personal gains, 
especially in the lead-up to elections. 
There are still allegations and audit findings from the BPK on the misuse of local expenditures, particularly grant spending 
and social assistance spending around the 2015, 2017, and 2018 elections. In addition, Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018) 
also indicates the politicization of the government program, especially grants, social assistance, and financial assistance, 
and in particular village funds. In addition, there are no comprehensive regulations on financial assistance expenditure, 
especially by district/municipality level governments, allowing such spending to be misused for political purposes. 
Hypothesis development 
Local government heads chosen by the community are regional politicians. Politicians, including regional heads of the 
democratic system, will create policies to help them being re-elected (Downs, 1957). According to the public choice 
theory, local government heads use budgets to appeal to people to vote for them again. Several previous studies have 
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examined the effect of performance on the re-selection of incumbents. Dharma and Martani (2016) found that the 
Performance Evaluation Score of Local Government Implementation (EKPPD) had a positive effect on the incumbents’  
selection; the higher the score, the greater is the probability of the incumbent being re-elected. The results of Dharma and 
Martani (2016) research are supported by Yuliati, Raharjo, and Siswantoro (2017), who found that higher EKPPD scores 
would increase incumbents’ probability of winning. Furthermore, more audit findings on the weakness of the internal 
control system will lower the incumbents’ probability of being re-elected. 
Studies examining the effect of spending on incumbent electability are still very limited. Kukołowicz and Górecki (2018) 
found that per capita expenditure has a positive effect on incumbent executives' re-election. Otherwise stated, incumbent 
candidates benefit from raising local government expenditures. Ritonga and Alam (2010) and Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, and 
Schulze (2013) find that their discretionary spending positively affects the probability of incumbents being re-elected. This 
means that they tend to rise discretionary spending ahead of elections and have the tendency to allocate discretionary funds 
to attract prospective voters. The discretionary spending allocation is not based on specific performance targets, meaning 
that the determination of the budget amount tends to be subjective, non-binding, and not sustainable. Thus, incumbents 
have the potential to misuse funds for political purposes. Therefore, the study hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H1: Discretionary spending ahead of elections has a positive effect on the chances of local government heads' victory. 
METHODOLOGY  
Population, sample, and sample selection 
The study population is 232 local governments in Indonesia that participated in the 2015 and 2017 local government head 
elections, which involved local government heads who served for one period and had the chance of being re-elected. These 
election periods were selected to observe the effects of Ministry of Internal Affairs, regulation number 39 of 2012, which 
was effectively implemented in 2013. It regulates the mechanisms of grants budgeting and social assistance spending and is 
more stringent than the previous regulations. In addition, the period chosen in this study aims to examine the effect of 
government regulation number 83 of 2012 on financial assistance to political parties, which tightly regulates the priority of 
using financial aid funds by political parties than the previous rules. Therefore, this study intends to establish whether the 
presence of these rules has been effective and is able to reduce the misuse of discretionary spending. 
The sampling method used was purposive sampling, excluding the new autonomous region because it is assumed that there 
is no motive for the local government head to allocate local expenditure for personal interests yet. The sample selection 
also excludes the regions conducting delayed elections and whose data are incomplete. In order to test the hypothesis, three 
periods, namely, (1) two years before the 2015 election, (2) year 2015, and (3) two years before the 2017 election, were 
used. The election year 2017 is excluded because the election took place at the beginning of the year and there was no 
political motive due to limited time for the local government heads to use discretionary spending.  
The data source for this study is from the General Elections Commission (KPU), the Director General of Regional 
Autonomy at the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Central Bureau of Statistics, and the Audit Board of the Republic of 
Indonesia’s Audit Report for 2013-2016. The sample selection process can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1: Sample Selection Process 
Local governments participating in the 2015 and 2017 elections who had local government heads who 
served for 1 period (incumbent) during the period 2013-2016 
Less: 
232 
Local governments with incomplete data (77) 
Local governments with incumbents not running again (22) 
Samples collected 133 
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
The research employed a quantitative approach using logistic regression. Logistic regression assumes that independent 
variables have a linear relationship with the logistics of the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2015). Thus, the result is the 
influence of independent variables on the probability of the dependent variable. The study includes the control variables of 
local government’s financial performance and total regional expenditure. The local government performance is measured 
by local government’s financial performance, i.e., its efficiency ratio, local revenue ratio, and the budget surplus. One 
problem that arises when an election is held directly is the use of local spending for private interests of regional heads to 
attract voters. Conversely, large regional expenditures (T-spend) can also mean high regional development. Therefore, the 
greater the regional expenditure released by the local government, the higher is the possibility of regional heads being 
elected (Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, & Schulze, 2013). 
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Locally generated revenue (PAD) reflects the ability of a local government to be able to run its operations without balance 
funds from the central government and without external debt financing. The allocation of discretionary spending should 
pay attention to the financial capacity of the region (e.g., local revenue) after prioritizing the fulfillment of compulsory 
business expenditures (Darmastuti & Setyaningrum, 2010). The greater the PAD, the greater is the ability of local 
governments to allocate discretionary spending. The greater the output than input, the more efficient a region is in 
managing its finances; expenditure in the area can mean the realization of services provided to the community (Mardiasmo, 
2009). A relatively high proportion of budget surplus (SiLPA) indicates non-optimal utilization of budget funds by local 
governments in the provision of public services and regional economic development (BKF Kementerian Keuangan, 2017). 
Therefore, a lower SiLPA proportion means better local government performance; thus, the probability of re-election of 
incumbents will also be higher.  
This study modifies the research model from Sjahrir et al. (2013) and Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) by adding financial 
assistance expenditure or transfer. The first model uses a proportion of total discretionary spending to total expenditure, 
while the second model breaks down the component of discretionary spending. Analysis of the data to test the research 
hypothesis was conducted using StataMP 13.0. The model used in the research to test the hypothesis is as follows: 
 Wini = β0 + β1DiscSpendi + β2TSpendi + β3PADi + β5Efficiencyi + β6SiLPAi + ei (1) 
 Wini = β0 + β1Granti + β2SocAssisti + β3FinAssisti + β4TSpendi + β5PADi + β6Efficiencyi + β7SiLPAi + ei (2) 
Table 2: Description of the Variables 
Variable Variable Operationalization 
Wini Dummy variable; worth 1 if the incumbent is re-elected, and 0 otherwise 
β0 Intercept 
β1, …, βn Regression coefficient of independent variables 
DiscSpendi 
Average of the total amount of discretionary spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading 
up to the election 
Granti 
Average amount of grant expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the 
election 
SocAssisti 
Average amount of social assistance spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to 
the election 
FinAssisti 
Average amount of financial assistance expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up 
to the election 
TSpendi Average amount of log total of regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election 
PADi Average amount of the ratio of locally-generated revenue per total revenue in the year before the election 
Efficiencyi Average number of efficiency ratios ahead of the election 
SiLPAi Average amount of the budget surplus divided by the total income of the year before the election 
ei Error coefficient  
DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows that the mean value of the discretionary spending proportion (Discspend) variable is 0.108, which means 
that 10.8% of the allocated expenditure and local transfers are used for grant expenditure, social assistance, and financial 
assistance.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grant 133 0.03440 0.01976 0.00688 0.11549 
SocAssist 133 0.01079 0.01889 - 0.13272 
FinAssist 133 0.06340 0.05141 - 0.22079 
Discspend 133 0.10859 0.06261 0.01306 0.28026 
Tspend (in mio) 133 1,310,000 837,000 397,000 5,750,000 
PAD 133 0.11245 0.09405 0.00664 0.56312 
Efficiency 133 0.97 0.06 0.82 1.18 
SiLPA 133 0.12 0.08 (0.01) 0.48 
 
Notes: Grant (the average amount of grant expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); SocAssist (the average 
amount of social assistance spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); FinAssist (the average amount of 
financial assistance  expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Discspend (the average of the total amount of 
discretionary spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Tspend (the average amount of log total of regional 
spending in the year leading up to the election); PAD (the average amount of the ratio of locally-generated revenue per total revenue in the year before the 
election); Efficiency (the average number of efficiency ratios ahead of the election); SiLPA (the average amount of the budget surplus divided by the total 
income of the year before the election). 
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Table 4 shows that out of the 225 local governments participating in the 2015 and 2017 elections, 155 (69%) had 
incumbent regional heads. 14% of the incumbents did not become candidates for regional head in the forthcoming election. 
Out of the 133 incumbents that contested the election, 71% had won. 
Table 4: Details of Incumbents 
Description Frequency % 
Local Government Heads 
 
First term (incumbent) 155 69% 
 
Second term (non-incumbent) 70 31% 
 
Total 225 100% 
Incumbent 
 
Running again 133 86% 
 
Not running again 22 14% 
 
Total 155 100% 
Incumbent Won 95 71% 
 
Lost 38 29% 
 
Total 133 100% 
Correlation test 
Unlike OLS, logistic regression does not require a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables. In 
addition, it does not require the testing of classical assumption of normality and heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2015). 
However, logistic regression does require the independent variables not to correlate with each other. In other words, 
observation should not come from repeated measurements. This means logistic regression requires that there is little or no 
multi-collinearity between the independent variables. 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Test of the Total Discretionary Spending Model 
 
win Discspend Tspend PAD Efficiency SiLPA 
Win 1 
     
Discspend -0.085 1 
    
Tspend 0.2296 -0.086 1 
   
PAD 0.1912 -0.3181 0.7104 1 
  
Efficiency 0.134 -0.3073 0.1237 0.051 1 
 
SiLPA 0.0017 -0.1914 0.2641 0.289 0.4827 1 
The criterion of testing by using Pearson correlation is if the correlation value of a variable is more than 0.8, then an 
independent variable has a strong correlation with other independent variables. The problem of multi-collinearity was not 
found in the multi-collinearity test results for the total discretionary spending model as shown in Table 5. This is evidenced 
by the correlation value being less than 0.8. 





FinAssist Tspend PAD Efficiency SiLPA 
Win 1 
       
Grant -0.0189 1 
      
SocAssist 0.0242 0.0694 1 
     
FinAssist -0.1053 0.112 0.1291 1 
    
Tspend 0.2296 0.0884 -0.0998 -0.102 1 
   
PAD 0.1912 0.055 -0.2 -0.3351 0.7104 1 
  
Efficiency 0.134 0.0445 -0.0676 -0.3665 0.1237 0.051 1 
 
SiLPA 0.0017 0.0924 -0.1378 -0.2179 0.2641 0.2894 0.4827 1 
It is proven through multi-collinearity test results for each discretionary spending model that there is no multi-collinearity 
problem, because the correlation value for all variables is less than 0.8. 
Hypothesis testing 
The first model in Table 6 presents the total discretionary spending test, while the second model presents each component 
of the discretionary spending. The results show that the average proportion of total and each component of discretionary 
spending have no effect on the probability of an incumbent’s victory in an election. The results of this study contradict 
those of the research of Kukołowicz and Górecki (2018), who found that the per capita expenditure has a positive effect on 
incumbent executives. This implies that the use of discretionary spending for political purposes prior to an election does not 
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necessarily mean an incumbent will be re-elected. This may be due to the widespread campaign of both government and 
non-government organizations and hence, voters are more crucial in choosing regional leaders. 
While the proportion of discretionary spending is generally not proven to affect the probability of incumbents’ victory, the 
control variable of total expenditure and financial performance, that is, the ratio of financial efficiency and the SiLPA ratio, 
proves to have a significant effect on the probability of an incumbent’s re-election. On the other hand, the PAD ratio is not 
proven to affect the probability of such re-election in a significant manner. 
The total variable of regional expenditure proved to have a significant positive effect on the probability of an incumbent’s 
victory. The financial efficiency ratio also proved to have a similar effect on the probability of incumbents winning with a 
very high probability level. In other words, by increasing financial efficiency, the incumbent’s probability of being elected  
will be very high. The SiLPA ratio is proven to affect incumbents’ selection significantly and negatively. This means that 
the smaller the SiLPA relative to the total regional revenue, the better is the performance of the local government; thus, the 
probability of re-inclusion of the incumbent will also be greater. However, the control variable result is in line with Dharma 
and Martani (2016) and Yuliati, Raharjo, and Siswantoro (2017), who found that the Performance Evaluation of Local 
Government Implementation (EKPPD) scores had a positive effect on incumbents’ selection; the higher the score, the 
greater is the probability of the incumbent being re-elected. 
Table 7: Effect of the Proportion of Discretionary Spending on Incumbents’ Victory 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Ind. Var Prediction Win Win 
  
Odd Ratio Coef. Sig. Odd Ratio Coef. Sig. 
Dep. Var 
       
Grant + 
   
0.00 -6.16 0.275 
SocAssist + 
   
1510.30 7.32 0.261 
FinAssist + 
   
0.21 -1.55 0.377 
DiscSpend + 0.32 -1.13 0.385 
   
TotalSpend + 1.00 0.00 0.053* 1.00 0.00 0.050** 
PAD + 34.52 3.54 0.202 50.11 3.91 0.187 
Efficiency + 1509.16 7.32 0.056** 1239.48 7.12 0.070* 
SiLPA - 0.00 -5.69 0.042** 0.00 -5.46 0.049** 
Constant 
 



















Notes: Grant (average amount of grant expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); SocAssist 
(average amount of social assistance spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); FinAssist (average 
amount of financial assistance expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Discspend (average of 
the total amount of discretionary spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Tspend (average 
amount of log total of regional spending in the year leading up to the election); PAD (average amount of ratio of locally-generated revenue per 
total revenue in the year before the election);efficiency (average number of efficiency ratios ahead of the election); SiLPA (average amount of 
the budget surplus divided by the total income of the year before the election). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Additional testing was conducted by testing the growth of discretionary spending (not tabulated). Among the sample of 133 
local governments, some samples with amounts of grant, social assistance, and previous year's financial aid worth zero 
were excluded, because they could not be assessed for their growth value. The growth of the proportion of discretionary 
spending was tested and it was found that total discretionary spending had a negative effect, despite being marginal (at 10% 
alpha). However, when each of the expenditures is observed, grant expenditure, social assistance, and financial aid 
expenditure have not been proven to affect the re-election of incumbents. These results reinforce previous findings, that in 
order to be re-elected, incumbents should avoid using discretionary spending and focus on performance, as using 
discretionary spending funds will not affect their chances. 
CONCLUSION 
The study aimed to investigate the opportunistic behavior of local government heads in using discretionary spending 
(consisting of grant spending, social assistance, and financial assistance) to help win elections. In general, no evidence was 
found that the average proportion and growth of discretionary spend expenditure affects the electability of incumbents in 
elections. In other words, the use of discretionary spending is not effective enough to attract the support of voters. The 
results of the study may provide inputs, especially for incumbents to focus more on performance, as this is proved to be 
influential and to provide a higher probability of an incumbent’s re-election and to avoid the use of discretionary spending 
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as an election winning strategy. The government and NGOs should inform voters to be more cautious about the 
opportunistic behavior of their leaders based on their performance. 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER STUDY 
The present study examined local governments whose regional heads took part in the 2015 and 2017 elections, but does not 
include those who participated in the 2018 election as a part of the sample. This is because the 2017 regional government 
financial report data audited by the supreme audit agency is not yet available. Further research could add more samples to 
increase the power of the test. This study measures the effect of discretionary spending on the probability of re-election 
using quantitative methods, so that it is less able to explore answers and motives of opportunistic behavior. An analysis of 
this motive by qualitative approach (by conducting interviews) with parties involved in allocating discretionary spending or 
BPK RI auditors will enrich the results. 
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